“If you do not pray, you will be in hell and God will not forgive you...You cannot eat food prepared by women who do not pray, you cannot eat food prepared by people who smoke and drink alcohol.”
That was a part of what a 47-year old Uighur road-builder in Xinjiang, China said back in 2016. He hectored his co-workers and warned them against engaging in ‘non-Muslim’ behaviour while making offensive remarks about the country’s majority Han ethnic group. Two years later, he was convicted for “incitement of ethnic hatred and ethnic discrimination” with a 10-year sentence - after his lawyer had sought leniency for this first-time offender.
Perhaps elsewhere in the world, he would be ignored and at worst viewed as a bigot. The Chinese state instead viewed his actions as criminal.
Imprisonment as a result of expressing Muslim religious identity in Xinjiang is not uncommon. Many within are aware of the minefield around them - even the ownership of the Quran can expose an individual to investigation by authorities. Yet perspectives are divided. Proponents of reform make their arguments on the foundation of ethnic cleansing and the immoral implications that accompany it, while supporters of the status quo see persecution as a way for the Chinese state to protect its political integrity from the spectre of terrorism.
This blog post aims to evaluate the two stances. Beginning with a summary of the history of Muslim religion in China, this is followed by a few major examples of censorship and ethnic assimilation before offering an overview of global perspectives. The post will then conclude by speculating on the possible ways forward and what the future may hold for Chinese Muslims.
Censorship and assimilation: protection of the political state or silencing freedom of expression?
The first assault on freedom of speech was the imposition of ‘Three No’s’ in Ghulja following riots in 1997. This sought to suppress alternative beliefs and in the decade that followed, widened the cultural gulf between Islamic and Chinese culture.
The censorship of Facebook, regarded by some as a wide-scale silencing mechanism, finds its roots in this troubled relationship. Although China is famous for its Great Wall, which attracts more than 10 million people per year who flock to different segments of the stone path that snakes through the country, it is also famous for its more recent Great Firewall, the nickname given to the legislative framework governing the domestic use of the Internet. Behind the regulations is purported to be a drive for social control and containment of sensitive information.
In late June 2009, tensions flared between Uighurs and Han Chinese workers in a Toy Factory in Guangdong over accusations that some Uighur workers had sexually assaulted a Han Chinese woman employee. Since the incident, the factory stopped employing Uighur workers, exacerbating the Uighur mistrust and resentment accumulated over months of lower pay relative to Han workers combined with the inability of the two groups to connect. A protest that began in early July in Xinjiang soon escalated into violent attacks targeting mostly Han Chinese people, resulting in 200 deaths and almost 2,000 injuries. Days after the riots, Xinjiang independence activists used Facebook as a platform to spread protest, creating groups for others to incite criticism of the Chinese state. Consequently, the platform was censored foreshadowing further misalignment of the Han-Uighur relationship.
The differences in the two cultures manifest further in the form of public reaction. Numerous nationalist media sources described the riots as fuel for separatism and support for Middle East terrorist organisations.3 Rebiya Kadeer, at the time the 2nd President of the World Uighur Congress, denied the claims, suggesting that it was caused by years of heavy policing, discontent over the Uighur treatment in Guangdong, and “years of Chinese repression.” 4 Consequently, the misattribution of motive establishes the first motif of the relationship between Uighurs and the Chinese state.
This has enabled King, Pan, and Roberts apply theories that see censorship as intrinsically tied to the state’s fear of political instability. Their state critique theory suggests that a key goal of the government is to suppress any dissent associated with political leadership. Moreover, to prevent the spillover of sensitive information, the government targets groups of people that have the potential to join together and express themselves collectively, known as the theory of collective action. It is hence implied that sensitive information about the political state is much like a plague, therefore, limiting its dissemination is a priority. Many ‘netizens’ appear to internalise the state’s perspective. Over 90 percent of netizens on Huanqiu (The Global Times), a daily tabloid newspaper focused on the reporting of international issues from a nationalistic perspective, believed that the activists’ behaviour “severely violate[d] China’s national interests”. Furthermore, on the aggregate level, 81.7 percent of Chinese netizens believed that Facebook should be punished, in some form or another, for being a medium conducive to activist discussions and incitation of riots. Consequently, fear is a component of the Uighur-Chinese relationship.
However, in a country with multiple cultures, beliefs, and values, rituals and traditions are varied as well. In some countries, the peaceful coexistence of different cultures creates a vibrant society. In others, political intolerance surrenders entire histories of culture to the wave of a hand. The Chinese states relationship with the Uighur people far exceed the parameters of fear. Indeed, behind the bars of internment camps, detainees are forced to learn Mandarin Chinese, sing ‘Red Songs’ to praise the Chinese Communist Party, and engage in the recitation of state rules. Human Rights Watch describes this phenomenon as “human rights violations...of a scope and scale not seen in China since the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution.” Large-scale razing since 2016 in Xinjiang has led to the partial or complete demolition of more than two dozen Islamic religious sites. What was a symbol of health, fertility and absolution is no more than a bare tomb. Visiting a sacred shrine three times, believed to be as good as completing the Hajj - a necessary holy pilgrimage to Mecca, though unaffordable for many from underdeveloped parts of Xinjiang - was no longer a possibility. Professor Rahile Dawut lamented in 2012 that the removal of Islamic architecture would render the religion void of the identity it gives individuals, detaching their “personal, cultural, and spiritual history”. Her disappearance in 2017 has widely believed to be a result of her academic research in Uighur studies, and many speculate that she is being held in a ‘political re-education’ camp in Xinjiang. Yet this Sinicisation of Islam is perhaps a deliberate effort of China to “guide Islam to be compatible with socialism” under a new law passed in January 2019. David Brophy remarks that the destruction of architecture is a way to sever Xinjiang’s links with the wider Islamic world and smooth the path for China to sculpt a new Sinicised Uighur Islam from scratch.
Underpinning the detention of Uighurs is the ‘Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism’ Campaign launched in May 2014. As a result of this campaign, ‘Big Brother’ seems to have grown a myriad of pairs of eyes, and the rate of arrest has leaped threefold since its introduction. CCTV cameras are noticeably prevalent to monitor suspicious activity, such as inappropriate wear, and some locales had QR codes assigned to every home. These ‘smart’ doorplates help officials to monitor statistics associated with the household, such as the number of people registered to live there. A mismatch in data and observation is an opportunity to question the intentions of visitors. Officials come every two to three days - yet the eyes of Big Brother probe deeper with officials checking inhabitants’ phones for inappropriate content and biometric data also having been collected, from DNA to voice samples. Making it even more difficult for the Uighur population is the asymmetric knowledge of regulations, with many of the targeted Uighurs not knowing exactly what is required of them.
Accompanying the suppression of China’s multicultural heritage is a layer of psychological oppression for those afflicted. When the state takes away the family’s breadwinner(s), life becomes difficult. Children are effectively orphaned when their parents are sent to internment camps; those between the age of five and 15 are sent to orphanages, of which 18 new ones were built in one Kashgar county alone in 2017. Alternatively, they are sent to boarding schools, of which conditions have been remarked to be poor.
There is also evidence to suggest that families are not just being divided but superseded, with Han Chinese people sent to fragmented Uighur families to act as their ‘relatives’ and monitor every aspect of their daily lives. This is a part of the ‘Becoming Family’ programme, and the length of stay of the ‘relatives’ depend on the political trustworthiness of the family. The presence of Chinese officials in Uighur homes meant that Uighurs were subject to house arrest, and only under permission could they leave the house; some, in particular, have had to surrender their bedroom to accommodate their ‘relatives.
The difficulties of familial separation endured by longing wives and husbands and lonely children are unanimously expressed by many. Uighurs have commented on the adversity of their lives and the impact it has had on their mental health, particularly emphasising the longing for their detained family members and the uncertainty that stretches ahead in time. There has been documented suicide threats or attempts by young children; a 10-year old boy who was not allowed to live at home because his father had been subject to political education, threatened to jump out of the window of his boarding school unless he was allowed to live with his mother at home. Yet the state has expressed the sole aim to be cracking down on terrorism. The Islamic heritage in Xinjiang is a source of potential for diversity in the Chinese state, but is its prevention worth the suffering of hundreds of thousands of innocent lives?
A global perspective: see no evil, hear no evil, and speak no evil?
A few considerations form the basis of condemnation (or inherent lack of it) across the globe, but political ties to China appear to be a non-trivial one where countries that stand to gain more from it may choose to see, hear and speak no evil. While many countries have criticised the actions of China, particularly the USA and EU, Muslim countries have been less vocal. The Council of Foreign Relations describes them as being “notably silent...prioritising their economic ties and strategic relationships with China” and in turn ignoring the human rights abuses. A signed letter by more than three dozen states, including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, praised China’s “remarkable achievements” in human rights and its “counterterrorism” efforts in Xinjiang.
Turkey has proven to be a small exception when Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu urged China to make a clear distinction between “terrorists and innocent people.” However, Cavusoglu balanced his argument by adding his support for ‘One China’; the somewhat contradictory encouragement of the Chinese authorities’ current courses of action suggest that Turkey is stuck on the fence. Consequently, it seems there is a trade-off of preserving political ties with China and encouraging them to change their treatment of Uighurs.
Even the situation in the US is not entirely straightforward. Despite toughening its stance on China’s crackdown on its Muslim minority, with the approval of the Uighur Act of 2019, the Trump administration’s actions are limited in scope. Approving the few Uighur families that survive the internment camp and make it to the US to seek asylum is important, but it nonetheless is a step back to striking a trade deal with Beijing.
The world is watching and many demand answers to pressing questions. But will anything be done, or will the ‘bystander effect’ result in political ties standing in the way?
Conventionally, we believe that the presence of more laws will uphold human rights. In this case, freedom of expression in China may benefit from a loosening of regulations. For the state to release its grip on the detained and marginalised Uighur population, one must begin to build common ground for reconciliation in the scars reflecting years of conflict, misunderstanding, and struggles with political forces.
Gladney believes that, among all Muslim nationalities in China, Uighurs are the most resistant to accepting integration. Although this may uphold their cultural heritage, it puts them at a severe disadvantage in terms of accessing power and resources in the country. This stands in contrast with more integrated nationalities such as the Hui Muslims that at the same time risk not only the loss of their identity but also the rejection of other Muslim groups as being too assimilated into Chinese society. At a time where the state is strengthening its iron fist to pound down the expression of alternative beliefs, without international support, the choice facing the Uighurs is of conformity or destruction. The Uighurs seem relegated to the heartbreaking choice of sacrificing their cultural heritage to mere memories or endure the suffering of familial separation and political detainment.
A piece by Brooklyn Han.
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